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Non-technical Summary 
 
In 2005, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) came into force. It is the 
cornerstone of the EU member states’ efforts to fulfil their emission reduction targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The protocol requires European countries to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by eight per cent until 2008. Our paper analyses the future impacts of the EU ETS 
on competitiveness. To achieve this we identify the relevant key characteristics of emission 
trading systems in general, and review the literature simulating the competitiveness impacts of 
the EU ETS. 
We have identified the choice of the reference scenario as the most critical issue for an 
appropriate analysis of the relevant literature. The results from all theoretical and simulation 
studies analysing environmental regulation depend substantially on the reference scenario, i.e. 
whether the impacts of the EU ETS are compared to a business as usual-scenario (BAU) with 
no regulation in place at all, or whether the impacts are compared with the impacts of another 
instrument such as Command and Control regulation (CaC). Given the legally binding 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has no alternative but to engage in environmental 
regulation to reduce CO2 emissions. 
If the reference scenario and other key assumptions of the models are identified and analysed, 
it is possible to obtain a relatively clear picture of how the introduction of the EU ETS 
influences Europe’s competitiveness. Most of the studies model the EU ETS and compare it 
with other regulation scenarios. The reference point is often Kyoto compliance without 
allowance trading. It makes sense to choose this scenario as it clearly demonstrates the 
efficiency or cost effects of emissions trading in relation to given environmental objectives. 
The alternative BAU scenario without emission reductions is used in single cases. 
The competitiveness record of the EU ETS is mixed, with emission trading coming out as the 
cheapest option, if we accept a reality with climate change and Kyoto compliance. Simulation 
studies suggest that the system offers major cost benefits when compared with Kyoto-based 
non-trading scenarios. Possible positive innovation effects must also be taken into account, 
depending on the actual design of the scheme. Winners and losers at the firm and sector level 
are identified, particularly in comparison with the BAU scenario, but even here the results of 
the studies analysed suggest only modest costs. The main reasons for potential negative 
impacts on Europe’s competitiveness found by some studies are the heterogeneous National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs) and the limitation of emissions trading to a handful of sectors. This 
means that the mechanism is by no means optimal from an economic point of view. 
Improvements in the system with significantly lower costs whilst retaining the same 
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ecological goals are certainly possible. The potential this represents for the instrument should 
not, however, obscure just how much has already been achieved with the EU ETS. If 
countries were required to comply with their Kyoto commitments without engaging in any 
trading at all, this would result in a substantial increase in costs. A well designed EU ETS is 
found to clearly be the cheapest option. 
Summing up, the impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness are modest, and they are smaller 
than the impacts of alternative regulation scenarios. Compared to these other regulation 
methods ETSs can have positive competitiveness effects. However, the EU ETS is not 
designed to boost Europe’s economy. Its prime purpose and justification is to ensure that 
Europe’s CO2 emissions are brought down and Kyoto targets are reached at minimal costs.  
The EU ETS should be justified on environmental grounds. It is especially important that 
modifications to the system due to economic considerations do not undermine the 
environmental goals associated with this policy instrument. The EU ETS will not be 
responsible for a significant reduction of EU competitiveness. 
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Abstract: This literature review analyses the impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness 
focussing on existing simulation studies. We have identified the choice of the reference 
scenario as the most critical issue for an appropriate analysis of the relevant literature. We 
find, however, that effects of the scheme on competitiveness are modest, even given the 
business as usual case that does not take the legally binding framework of the Kyoto Protocol 
into account. Furthermore, the impacts of the EU ETS are smaller than the impacts of 
alternative Kyoto-based regulation scenarios. Compared to these other regulation methods 
ETSs can have positive competitiveness effects. However, the EU ETS is not designed to 
boost Europe’s economy. Its prime purpose and justification is to ensure that Europe’s CO2 
emissions are brought down and Kyoto targets are reached at minimal costs. To our opinion, it 
is therefore important that the system as well as modifications to it do not undermine the 
environmental goals associated with this policy instrument.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2005, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) came into force. This 
scheme is a crucial cornerstone of the efforts being made by the EU member states to fulfil 
the emissions reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol requires European 
countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by eight per cent until 2008. The baseline 
is the level of emissions in 1990. The ETS does not apply to all emissions generated in the 
EU, however. It is confined only to CO2 emissions of installations in the four sectors of 
energy (e.g. electric power, direct emissions from oil refineries), production and processing of 
ferrous metals, minerals (e.g. cement, glass) and pulp and paper. The ETS will cover almost 
half (46 per cent) of total CO2 emissions in the EU countries. In the scheme’s first phase 
(2005 to 2007) the emission allowances are grandfathered according to National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) of the member states, in the second phase (2008 to 2012) up to 10 per cent can 
be auctioned. European firms may partly fulfil their emissions reduction obligations outside of 
the EU by using flexible instruments such as Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). However, the relevant European Directive demands 
member states to restrict the use of these credits, suggesting a review in case a 6 per cent limit 
for the use of JI and CDM is exceeded1.  
The current design of the EU ETS has been heavily criticised by the scientific community for 
its lack of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. With respect to the ETS’ 
ecological effectiveness, it seems obvious that Kyoto and national targets were not considered 
sufficiently in setting caps. Consequently, only few countries are actually on a path to achieve 
their Kyoto targets. Furthermore, many countries shifted reduction obligations to the non-
trading sectors (Böhringer et al., 2005), weakening the economic efficiency of the system in 
relaxing the reduction obligations without having a clear mechanism to ensure reductions in 
the non-trading sectors. 
As a result of the scheme’s implementation in January 2005, companies in energy intensive 
industries have criticised an anticipated loss of competitiveness partially due to increasing 
energy prices. The claim that competitiveness in Europe is strongly affected by the 
introduction of the ETS is not unchallenged, though. Generally, e.g. compared to labour costs, 
even for the energy intensive industry the importance of energy costs remains modest2. 
Furthermore, the Porter hypothesis suggests positive impacts of an ETS on innovation and, 
                                                 
1 For a general description of the EU ETS see for example Kruger and Pizer (2004). 
2 Given the German example, a 6 per cent increase in energy costs for the energy intensive sectors corresponds 
to an increase of labour costs of only 1 per cent (Eikmeier et al., 2005). 
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consequently, on competitiveness. Additionally, one has to bear in mind the predominance of 
grandfathered rather than auctioned emissions certificates as well as the costs of inaction, i.e. 
the external costs of climate change3.  
Our paper attempts to analyse this future impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness. To 
achieve this we aim at identifying the key determinants and characteristics of emission trading 
systems, and review the relevant literature. We admit, however, that it is not at all clear how 
the EU ETS will develop subsequent to the planned trading period from 2008 to 2012. 
Therefore, the long term effects on competitiveness are highly uncertain.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodolody and the guiding 
principles of the study: How did we select our reviewed studies? What is the reference case 
analysed in the simulation studies? What is the relevance of the famous Porter hypothesis in 
the EU ETS case and what can the US experience from emissions trading tell us? And what is 
the theoretical background of an expected impact of the EU ETS on competitiveness? In the 
third section, we discuss the existing simulation studies. Section 4 sums up the main findings 
of this paper and gives concluding remarks. 
2. Methodology and guiding principles of this study 
2.1. Business as usual vs. alternative instruments as reference case 
We have identified the choice of the reference scenario as the most critical issue of the study. 
This is crucial in all theoretical and simulation studies analysing environmental regulation 
since the results depend substantially on the chosen reference standard, i.e. whether the 
impacts of the EU ETS are compared to a business as usual scenario (BAU) with no 
regulation in place at all, or whether the impacts are compared with the impacts of another 
instrument such as taxes or Command and Control regulation (CaC). 
This question is highly relevant for the analysis of an EU ETS since the BAU is hardly a 
realistic reference scenario for policymakers. The EU ETS is the key approach Europe takes 
to achieve compliance with the emission reduction targets defined in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given the existence of this agreement, the EU has no alternative but to engage in 
environmental regulation. Inaction is not a realistic option. 
                                                 
3 In their latest methodology update, the ExternE project refers to damage costs of 9€/tC for a medium discount 
rate (Bickel and Friedrich, 2005). The assessment of such costs is difficult and controversial, however, especially 
given that they are uncertain and occur in the future (cp. e.g. Rennings and Hohmeyer, 1999). 
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2.2. The Porter hypothesis and early US ETS experience 
The view that environmental regulation like an emission trading scheme is merely a source of 
costs and thus entails competitive disadvantages for the affected firms and companies is 
controversial. The key argument against this view – i.e. that environmental action can actually 
generate competitive advantages – is based on what is referred to as the 'Porter hypothesis'. 
This hypothesis postulates that, in the long run, the objectives of environmental protection and 
commercial competitiveness are congruent with each other (cf. for example Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995). Specifically, Porter argues that a pioneering environmental policy role can 
create technological first mover advantages and make companies more innovative. This is 
based on the assumption that other countries follow in the footsteps of the pioneering country 
and adopt environmental regulations at some later point in time. If this does actually happen, 
the regulation imposed on domestic industry at an earlier point in time will give the 
pioneering country an adjustment head start. It enables providers of environmental 
technologies to export their solutions to other countries and the greater (ecological) efficiency 
of such technology on the domestic market will place them at an advantage vis-à-vis their 
foreign competitors. 
The empirical evidence for the Porter hypothesis is mixed. Most studies tend at least to 
demonstrate that stricter environmental regulations do not result in a significant deterioration 
in competitiveness (cp. Rennings et al., 2004). An example of the validity of the hypothesis 
is provided by Albrecht (1998). In relation to the 1978 Montreal Ozone Protocol Albrecht 
identifies the USA and Denmark as pioneers and demonstrates that the competitive position 
of the relevant companies in these countries improved. 
It would seem therefore that, ideally, strict environmental regulations can have a positive 
impact on innovation and competitiveness. However, if the conditions are not right – if other 
countries do not follow suit, or to a much lesser extent – Porter’s case for enhanced 
competitiveness ceases to be quite so persuasive. In the case of climate protection it is 
possible that other regions outside the EU might "follow suit" and that, as the lead market, 
the EU could profit from a first mover advantage. There are some developments indicating 
that the EU ETS is a first step towards a global diffusion of emissions trading systems. A 
regulation trend towards ETS can be interpreted as a forecast for a demand trend towards 
carbon-efficient technologies, and thus towards first mover advantages for the pioneering 
country (Beise-Zee and Rennings, 2005). What is more, the EU ETS could even extend to 
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other parts of the world on a mid-horizon view4. This is by no means certain, however, as it 
would – at least theoretically – be worthwhile for other countries to adopt a free rider 
position with regard to public goods such as climate protection (cp. e.g. Hoel, 1991). 
What is more, the ETS can only establish the EU as a lead market for CO2 reducing 
innovations if the mechanism delivers sufficient incentives to innovate. In its present form, 
however, the system is not particularly demanding with regard to CO2 reductions and this 
could lessen its innovation incentives. The main reason for this is the design of the NAPs. 
For example, the German NAP is less demanding compared to the earlier voluntary 
agreement of the German industry (cp. e.g. SRU, 2006). Furthermore, experience from the 
comparable American schemes (US Acid Rain and Regional Clean Air Incentives Market) 
shows that innovation effects are limited (Gagelmann and Frondel, 2005). The reasons for 
this are mainly to be found in the overly weakening design of flexible mechanisms, 
indicating small innovation incentives for the EU ETS, as well. 
Initial evidence from the EU ETS does, however, suggest that the system could trigger 
compensatory innovations in the relevant industries. In a survey conducted by the European 
Commission DG Environment, McKinsey and Ecofys (2005), half of the surveyed 
companies stated that the mechanism had a strong or medium influence on their innovation 
decisions. Time will tell if these statements will be reflected in real innovations and efforts 
by companies to increase energy efficiency and to reduce energy demand.  
2.3. Short-term background of EU ETS impacts on competitiveness 
There are not only a number of different definitions of competitiveness, various aspects of 
competitiveness can also be measured in completely different ways. What we want to analyse 
is the economic performance of producers. There are various means of measuring this, such as 
a company's sales or productivity. Studies of the EU ETS usually only provide information 
about the costs of the emissions trading system, in other words about the possible increases or 
reductions in costs induced by the introduction of the ETS or in comparison with other 
regulations. Considering the lack of any better measures, they can be used here as a measure 
of companies' competitiveness as these costs are part of the productivity of companies. In 
general, one can say that increasing costs result in falling corporate productivity. An 
alternative measure is the change in output or GDP. To our understanding, these are also 
indicators of the competitiveness or economic performance of companies, sectors or entire 
economies. 
                                                 
4 Norway and Switzerland are currently designing schemes closely related to the EU ETS and therefore could be 
linked to it relatively soon. Other linking candidates are e.g. Canada, Japan, and Russia. 
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A study undertaken by Carbon Trust (2004) identifies three factors which determine the 
impact of an ETS on competitiveness in the short run. Here, Porter-like innovation effects that 
may become relevant in a mid- or long-horizon view are neglected. An overview of the short-
run impacts is given in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: The short-term factors determining the impact of the EU ETS on 
competitiveness 
  
Figure 2 shows that the first and foremost factor is energy intensity. The second factor is the 
ability to pass on higher costs via prices and the third is the ability to avoid CO2 consumption 
during production or to replace CO2 intensive inputs. The impact of energy intensity on 
competitiveness can be broken down into two effects. The first effect only concerns 
companies or sectors which participate in the system and is based on the fact that companies 
have to purchase additional allowances if they wish to emit more CO2 than they are allowed 
to under their free permits. This gives rise to additional costs and impairs competitiveness. If 
the opposite case applies, however, the ETS introduction can have the opposing effect 
("windfall profits" or "hot air"). The second effect, on the other hand, also affects non ETS 
participants and is based on the fact that the system could induce higher electricity prices. 
Given opportunity cost reasoning of utilities, this is a plausible scenario. In this case, all 
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the flexibility induced, however, the effect on energy intensity is likely to be significantly 
lower under the EU ETS than under alternative regulations.  
The more effectively prices can be passed on the less companies or sectors will suffer under 
an ETS. Determining factors in this context are the price elasticity of demand and the 
competitive situation. The less elasticity and competition the less impact the ETS will have on 
competitiveness. 
Finally, and as mentioned previously, the ability to avoid CO2 emissions or to substitute CO2 
intensive inputs also plays a role. An ETS will put less pressure on sectors or companies 
which can do this better than others. There are no fundamental differences in this respect 
between an ETS and any other systems of regulation. In the long run, however, there may be a 
connection with the Porter hypothesis explained in the previous section. Abatement also 
depends on how strong the system-inherent incentives to abate emissions are. Permit solutions 
generally perform well in this respect. The advantages are particularly clear when compared 
with CaC instruments. However, as the current NAPs do not appear to be particularly 
demanding, the incentives under the specific design of the EU ETS may prove to be relatively 
modest.  
From a theoretical point of view there is therefore a tendency – in comparison with a BAU 
scenario – to assume that energy-intensive companies or sectors at least will be subject to 
greater burdens with the attendant effects on the economy as a whole. This is not very 
surprising. On the other hand an ETS does have competitive advantages when compared with 
alternative regulation scenarios. These are particularly apparent when compared with CaC 
instruments, although the differences when compared with other market conform regulation 
approaches remain more modest. The advantage of the EU ETS with grandfathering is the 
comparatively lower costs imposed by the system5. At the same time, of course, this also 
means that it offers fewer incentives to innovate. 
2.4. Selection of studies 
Due to the early state of our review no empirical data is available on how emissions trading 
affects competitivness. Thus empirical literature in terms of econometric studies is not 
available. Our literature review consequently focuses on economic theory and simulation 
studies, the so-called “theory with numbers”. 
Due to the limited number of studies we have considered all existing studies for our analysis 
dealing with (European) emissions trading and competitiveness. All reviewed models belong 
                                                 
5 Free allocation is often referred to as minimising the cost impact. Especially in a mid- or long-horizon view, 
grandfathering may offer important advantages (cp. e.g. Cramton and Carr, 2002). 
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to three groups of models and have different strengths and weaknesses: Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models, partial models (which are in nearly all cases energy models) and 
macroeconometric models. Each model type has its advantages and disadvantges (see Table 
1). With respect to our application of the models in the context of an impact assessment of the 
EU ETS on competitiveness, we should e.g. not expect specific insights into the market 
structure of single markets such as the power market from CGE models. However, CGE 
models give an orientation regarding the magnitude of indirect effects, which are more 
relevant for a simulation of the employment rather than competitiveness effects, though. E.g. 
energy models do not say anything on indirect effects. All models have in common that they 
can not reproduce Porter-like innovation effects. This shortcoming has to be borne in mind. 
 
Table 1: Suitability of models with respect to selected criteria 
 CGE Models Partial Models Macroeconometric 
Models 
Range of Coverage of 
Measure 
single-/multi-market 
analysis with economy-
wide impacts and effects 
in secondary markets 
single-market analysis 
without economy-wide 
impacts 
single-/multi-market 
analysis with economy-
wide impacts and effects 
in secondary markets 
Purpose of Model 
Analysis 
simulation (long-term) simulation (long-term) forecasting (short-
/medium-term) 
Degree of 
Disaggregation between 
Sectors or Households 
potentially high - potentially low 
Degree of 
Disaggregation within 
Sectors  
potentially low potentially high potentially low 
 
Generally, all studies contribute to the questions addressed in this paper. As expected, all 
models generate the same qualitative results, i.e. that trading systems are superior to non-
trading systems, and that unrestricted trading is more efficient than restricted trading. Due to 
the nature of the models and the year of the study, the question of the design of NAPs is not 
addressed in detail. One exception is the SIMAC model which addresses the question of how 
allowances were allocated at the national level, and how this affects costs. 
Our approach consists of looking at the results across different types of models, all based on 
the methodological approaches described at the beginning of each chapter, in order to draw 
conclusions regarding the magnitude of effects that can be expected from emissions trading. 
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3. Simulation studies on the EU ETS 
 
PRIMES 
A partial equilibrium model of the energy market is the PRIMES model applied by Capros 
and Mantzos (2000). It analyses the economic impact of variants of the EU ETS. Compliance 
with the Kyoto targets in each country is analysed and used as reference scenario 
(alternatively, within individual sectors of individual countries). The modelled scenarios are 
(1) an EU-wide trading system between power utilities, (2) an EU-wide trading system which 
includes power utilities and energy-intensive industries, (3) an EU-wide trading system which 
includes all sectors and industries and (4) an international trading system within all Annex B 
countries taking account of all sectors. 
The simulations reveal that emission trading substantially reduces the costs of the Kyoto 
protocol. The savings are dependent on the implied scenarios and, in the case of alternative 
reference frameworks, are between 20.7 and 48.6 per cent. The savings increase as emission 
trading expands. While savings remain relatively modest when emissions are traded by power 
utilities, they are highest in the system with the Annex B countries. Scenarios two and three 
generate savings of 24 and 34 per cent respectively. 
The PRIMES model consequently demonstrates that all participants gain from emissions 
trading. The results imply, however, that the highest marginal abatement costs borne by EU 
member countries are incurred in Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands. These countries are 
thus among the net purchasers in the system while France and Germany are the largest seller 
countries. Trading also proves to be all the more beneficial the more prevalent and widespread 
trading is. The EU ETS actually introduced is to some extent comparable with the scenario 
two in the model. The results suggest that while the EU system is more beneficial than the no 
trading scenario, it is by no means optimal when compared with alternative scenarios 
including emissions reduction commitments by additional countries. 
 
POLES 
The POLES partial equilibrium model of energy systems (IPTS 2000) compares EU-wide 
trading with a reference scenario up to 2010 in which no trading takes place. In this reference 
scenario, each country or region must meet the Kyoto obligations without European-wide 
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trading6. The model measures the impact of the EU ETS on the basis of an aggregated study 
up to the year 2010. Whether one particular country comes out better or not depends on the 
extent to which the country has managed to reduce its costs by trading permits compared with 
a non-trading scenario. 
The results of the study reveal that the northern European countries bear the highest Kyoto 
costs as a share of their respective GDP. In the trading scenario, costs of 0.48 per cent of GDP 
are incurred. In comparison, the costs incurred in other regions do not exceed 0.17 per cent 
(Italy). However, almost all countries benefit from trading compared with the reference case. 
Given this view, only France remains unaffected by the EU ETS. Gains are highest in the 
southern European countries (savings of 62 per cent), with Germany (50 per cent) and Italy 
(20 per cent) also doing particularly well. The biggest net sellers are Germany and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
GETS 3 
The GETS 3 (ERM and Eurelectric, 2002) energy market model attempts to capture the 
overall costs and incidence of costs on the basis of a number of different design variants of the 
ETS. The study encompasses the electricity industry and another nine sectors of the 
manufacturing industry in 20 countries (EU 15 and five other potential trading partners). The 
study focuses on a pre-compliance period 2005-2007 and two compliance periods 2008-2012 
and 2013-2017. The study analyses three base scenarios: a "no-trading" scenario in which no 
trading and no JI/CDM is licensed, the "latest guess" scenario which reflects the scope of 
trading proposed in the publication on the EU directive on the ETS of March 2002, and the 
"perfect trading" scenario. This implies unlimited trading between all the countries and 
sectors studied from the year 2005 onwards. 
The aggregated abatement costs are lowest in the perfect trading scenario. Limited trading of 
the type in the latest guess scenario increases overall costs by 1.6 billion euros. Separate 
compliance with the reduction commitments of each single country, in other words the no 
trading scenario results in an increase in overall costs compared with the perfect trading 
scenario of 80.5 billion euros. This is mainly due to the result given that companies do not 
achieve their reduction goals and must consequently pay penalties. 
                                                 
6 The study encompasses six EU countries/regions – Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
remaining southern EU countries in a single group (Spain, Portugal, Greece) as well as northern EU states 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden). 
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The findings of the study also suggest that the choice of reference year is decisive for the 
allocation of emission credit purchaser and seller roles. The electricity industry is particularly 
sensitive to variations in the reference year. 
The inclusion of additional greenhouse gases (in addition to CO2) only has a minor impact on 
overall costs. This is because the study only covers industrial sectors while other greenhouse 
gases are mainly produced in other sectors. According to the study, a sector-based allocation 
of reduction goals leads to substantial distributional effects and favours sectors with lower 
rates of growth. An allocation variant of this type has no impact on the total compliance costs 
of the favoured sectors, however. Auctioning of allowances on the other hand triggers 
redistribution between the sectors depending on the precise recycling route. 
The study confirms the positive impact of an ETS on the lowering of costs if Kyoto 
compliance without trading is used as the reference scenario. The study also shows, though, 
that the existing EU ETS leaves potentials for improved competitive effects. These potentials 
are caused by restricting trading to a few sectors.  
 
Smale et al. 
Smale et al. (2006) use a Cournot oligopoly model to deliver a sector by sector analysis of the 
effects of the EU ETS on competitiveness7. They extensively describe two scenarios 
modelled: A lower price scenario based on an allowance price of 15€/tCO2, and a higher price 
scenario (30€/allowance). The reference scenario, in contrast to the studies discussed thus far, 
is BAU. 
The study investigates the cement, newsprint, petroleum, steel and aluminium sectors. Its 
results demonstrate that, even compared to a situation where no regulation takes place, 
allowance trading probably only has a minor influence on the productivity of the relevant 
sectors. What is interesting that the earnings of four out of the five sectors analysed rise due to 
the introduction of EU ETS given any scenario. The authors argue that the grandfathered 
allowances are more valuable for these sectors than the marginal cost rise implied. Only the 
aluminium sector is identified being a loser of the EU ETS. Under both scenarios, sector 
output and consequently earnings collapse by 100 per cent. This means that the model suggest 
complete relocation of the aluminium sector to outside of the EU ETS area although it is not 
participating in emissions trading. This is due to the projected increase in electricity prices 
which increases production costs as well as the intensive global competition to which the 
sector is subject. Smale et al. qualify, however, that aluminium smelters could associate with 
                                                 
7 The analyses undertaken by Smale et al. (2006) and by Carbon Trust (2004) are based on the same model. Due 
to their up-to-dateness, only the simulation results of Smale et al. are discussed in this review. 
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electricity generators in order to attenuate this impact. In this case, the generators would 
suffer from smaller earnings. 
 
Reinaud 
Reinaud (2005) also projects modest competitiveness losses of European firms in comparison 
with the business as usual case. Reinaud uses rising CO2 emissions and thus the BAU 
according to the World Energy Outlook as the reference and models two emissions trading 
scenarios: The 10 per cent scenario in which the industry is allocated allowances under the 
EU ETS covering 90 per cent of its emission needs and the 20 per cent scenario in which the 
industry is allocated allowances to cover 80 per cent of its emission needs. 
Loss of competitiveness is defined as loss in output – whether as a reduction in demand or the 
displacement of production from one country to another (leakage). Reinaud, like Smale et al. 
(2006), identifies the aluminium sector as the industry the most seriously affected by the 
scheme. As a result of a cost increase of 3.7 per cent in both scenarios and an allowance price 
of 10€/tCO2 the study calculates a fall in demand, at an unchanged margin, of 2.9 per cent. 
The drop is more modest for the other industries analysed and does not exceed half a per cent 
for cement and steel, for example. Reductions in operational earnings are only predicted to be 
more significant if the authors make the extreme assumption of perfect competition on the 
observed markets.  
 
SIMAC 
Böhringer et al. (2005) use the partial model SIMAC to evaluate the actually implemented EU 
ETS. The model consists of marginal abatement cost curves for the European countries 
participating in the system. The authors analyse three different scenarios: Besides a no trading 
– Kyoto commitment without interstate trading – and a perfect trading scenario including all 
European sectors8 and countries, the actually implemented EU ETS (scenario NAP) is 
modelled. The authors find two main conclusions: First, the hybrid emissions regulation 
implying that only few sectors participate in the ETS leads to substantial excess costs. 
Second, it induces politically delicate burden shifting between sectors participating and not 
participating in the ETS.  
The results suggest that compliance costs under NAP are eight times higher than under perfect 
trading and still five times higher than for purely domestic – but efficient – abatement action. 
This is in contrast to the other studies reviewed which generally show that the actually 
                                                 
8 Among these, households and transport are the most important sectors regarding CO2 emissions. 
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implemented EU ETS implies at least better competitiveness effects than domestic action. The 
SIMAC results are mainly due to the assumption that the generous NAPs shift abatement to 
sectors not participating at the ETS where, in this case, domestic action applies. Therefore, it 
is assumed that sectors not participating suffer from costs induced by domestic policies which 
are a direct consequence of the NAPs. The results provided by the SIMAC model suggest that 
restrictions to the EU ETS induce additional costs and therefore harm competitiveness. The 
actually implemented NAP scenario is shown to be inefficient, as it shifts the whole abatement 
obligation from the traded to the non-trading sectors, which is not at all intended in the theory 
of emission trading. Therefore, the results calculated by Böhringer el al. suggest that an 
extension of the EU ETS to other sectors would improve competitiveness in Europe. This is in 
line with the other studies reviewed here. Additionally, SIMAC produces markedly less 
important negative effects if JI/CDM is introduced. 
 
DART 
In contrast to the studies described so far, the DART model (Klepper and Peterson 2004) 
analyses competitiveness on the basis of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The 
study analyses 16 regions9 and twelve sectors (of which four participate in the ETS). The 
results relate to the year 2012. The model uses the BAU as the reference scenario.  
In the competitiveness analysis the authors model the allocation of allowances on the basis of 
a least cost approach, abatement costs and potentials, including the sectors outside the ETS. 
The change in output is used as an indicator for competitiveness. Alongside the BAU use is 
made of a unilateral policy scenario (UNI) in which the individual regions comply with the 
Kyoto goals without interstate trading. 
The simulation generates negative competitive effects for the EU ETS when the BAU case is 
taken as the reference. If all the sectors are studied in aggregate, the reduction in output of 0.3 
per cent is fairly modest, however. Individual sectors suffer more dramatic drops. Compared 
with UNI, all sectors gain from the ETS, including sectors which do not take part in the ETS. 
If the drop in output in comparison with the BAU in the least cost scenario for the 
participating energy sector (oil products, electricity) is two per cent, it is more than double as 
high under UNI. The results for the remaining sectors are similar, only that part of the energy 
sector which does not take part in the ETS (coal, gas) has high losses in the least cost scenario 
(ten per cent), although these are two percentage points higher in the UNI case. 
                                                 
9 DART includes nine EU countries or groups of countries and seven regions outside Europe. 
 13
Overall, the DART model thus shows significant reductions in output to some extent and 
consequently loss of competitiveness if the EU ETS is compared as a least cost scenario with 
the BAU. If, on the other hand, one applies Kyoto measures, emissions trading generates 
positive competitive effects including in sectors which do not take part in emissions trading. 
In some sectors, this ameliorates the negative Kyoto effects by over 50 per cent. 
 
GTAP-E 
With GTAP-E, Kemfert et al. (2005) use a modified version of the general equilibrium model 
GTAP. The authors perform three experiments, focusing primarily on the competitive factor 
of marginal abatement costs. The study is based on data provided by the NAPs of the EU 
ETS. In experiment 1 the marginal abatement costs are estimated for a case in which every 
national sector is required to comply with NAP targets without engaging in trading. 
Experiment 2 allows national trading. Experiment 3 additionally provides for trading between 
EU countries. GTAP includes 17 European and four international regions. 57 different sectors 
can be distinguished. 
In comparison with experiment 1, experiment 2 leads to major efficiency gains because, under 
the non-trading scenario, large differences in abatement costs are calculated with Greece, the 
Netherlands and Sweden gaining in particular. As of the transition to experiment 3, all 
countries gain although cost reductions are more moderate between the second and third 
experiments. Altogether, the GTAP calculates major reductions in costs via emissions trading 
compared to non-trading scenarios under Kyoto. The broader based a trading system is, the 
more countries and sectors stand to gain from it. A good example is provided by the extreme 
savings made by the oil refining sector in Sweden where marginal abatement costs in $/tCO2 
drop from 163 (experiment 1) to 8.4 (generally for Sweden, experiment 2) and finally to 2 (for 
the entire EU, experiment 3). 
 
GTAP-ECAT 
COWI (2004) use GTAP-ECAT (European Carbon Allowance Trading) to assess impacts of 
the EU ETS on competitiveness. They model two different ETS scenarios – long-term 
adaptation as well as sluggish shorter-term adaptation. As a reference scenario, BAU is used. 
GTAP-ECAT results suggest that competitiveness is affected in Europe due to the ETS 
introduction. It calculates a loss of productivity inducing a reduction of the overall production 
value of -0.36 per cent (-0.48 per cent with sluggish adaptation). These are comparable to 
other models like DART using BAU as a reference. The estimated allowance price is 17 
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€/tCO2 (26.5 €/tCO2). The authors stress that JI/CDM, which are taken into account in the 
calculations, may be an important element for cost-efficiency of EU ETS. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the EU implements an optimal split between trading and non-trading sectors. A 
non-optimal split, however, would increase costs of the trading scheme. 
4. Conclusion  
This paper analyses the link between the introduction of the EU ETS and competitiveness in 
Europe on the basis of a literature review with a focus on simulation studies. The choice of 
the reference scenario was identified to be of fundamental importance for the results; in other 
words, whether the introduction of an EU ETS is compared with BAU or with a no trading 
system is crucial. Given Europe’s Kyoto commitment to an 8 per cent reduction of 1990 
emission levels, only comparing with alternative regulation refers to realistic options in 
today’s political context. What is more, the results are also dependent on other assumptions, 
mainly the inclusion of flexible instruments and the modelling of (partial) auctioning. If these 
factors are identified and analysed it is possible to obtain a relatively clear picture of how the 
introduction of the EU ETS influences Europe’s competitiveness. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the most important results of the studies analysed above. 
An ETS as the market conform allowance solution would, theoretically, enable ecological 
objectives such as emission reductions to be met at minimum cost. However, there is massive 
room for improvement for the current EU ETS since this is far from perfect in terms of its 
efficiency. According to the models analysed above, heterogeneous NAPs and the limitation 
of emissions trading to a handful of sectors are among the major flaws10. Although this may 
be seen as a first step towards (efficient) emissions reduction, the mechanism is by no means 
at its optimum from an economic point of view. Improvements at significantly lower costs 
whilst retaining the ecological goals are possible. Evidence for this is provided by the 
simulation studies analysed here. GETS3, for example, estimates possible savings at 1.6 
billion euros. 
Highlighting the potential improvements of the instrument should not, however, obscure just 
how much has already been achieved with the EU ETS. If countries were required to comply 
with their Kyoto commitments without engaging in any trading at all, this would result in a 
substantial increase in costs to reach their obligatory emission reduction targets. A well 
designed EU ETS is a by far cheaper option. Again the GETS3 demonstrates cost savings in 
the EU ETS-related scenario compared with a non-trading scenario of around 79 billion euros. 
                                                 
10 The extension debate will be part of the revision of the relevant ETS Directive, scheduled for 2006 and to 
become binding ahead of Phase 3 (post 2012). 
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In this respect the otherwise very different simulation models come to fairly similar 
conclusions. An exception to this is the SIMAC model. This finding becomes only relevant, 
however, if there will be strict domestic action in the non-trading sectors across Europe. At 
present, this is not clear, though. 
 
Table 2: Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading System on competitiveness in Europe – 
Simulation studies results 
Model Reference 
Scenario 
Effects on Competitiveness 
Reference Scenario: Business As Usual 
Smale et al.  (2006) BAU Positive effects: Cement, Printing, Petroleum, Steel: Positive 
effect on earnings  
Negative effects: Aluminium industry: -100 % earnings 
Reinaud (2005) BAU Most sectors: Very small and diverse effects 
Negative effects: Aluminium industry: Costs +3.7 %, demand -
2,9 % 
DART (2004) BAU Negative effects: Effects overall: Output -0.3 % 
Negative effects: Energy sector: Output -2 % 
GTAP-ECAT (2005) BAU Negative effects: Effects overall: Output -0.36 % (-0.48 % with 
sluggish technology adaptation) 
Reference Scenario: No Trade 
POLES (2000) No Trade Positive effects: Abatement Costs -25 % on average 
PRIMES (2000) No Trade Positive effects: Abatement Costs -25 % on average 
GETS 3 (2002) No Trade Positive effects: Abatement Costs -80.5 billion € (maximum) 
SIMAC (2005) No Trade Negative effects: Compliance Costs +400 % (actual NAPs, costs 
accrue mainly in non-participating sectors) 
DART (2004) No Trade Positive effects: Effects overall: Small output growth 
Positive effects: Energy sector: Output +3% 
GTAP-E (2005)  No Trade Positive effects: Abatement Costs -98 % (maximum) 
 
What is interesting is that even when compared with business as usual the losses in most 
sectors are modest. With emission trading the EU has implemented an instrument that will 
have two positive effects for a relatively cheap price: it may significantly contribute to CO2 
emission reduction to tackle climate change while triggering the necessary structural change 
in the power sector and other industries to make Europe ready for the future. While most 
sectors analysed in the literature are only subject to these very modest costs, the aluminium 
sector is an exception from the rather positive trend, with its particular competitive situation, 
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little options to reduce the electricity dependency of the production process and hence profits 
highly dependent on energy prices.  
A survey conducted by the European Commission DG Environment, McKinsey and Ecofys 
(2005) shows that around 50 percent of the interviewed companies already build system costs 
into their prices. 70 percent state that this will continue to be the case in the future. The results 
of the same study also suggest that the EU ETS has a more powerful innovative impact than 
economic theory would expect given the not very demanding NAPs and lack of incentives for 
clean investments. While an allowance system undoubtedly offers major advantages 
compared with other forms of regulation such as CaC measures, the less stringent design of 
the current scheme and experiences with trading systems in the USA counter indicate a quick 
surge in innovation. Innovative progress is only likely to take place in the long term and 
depends on a significant devaluation in currently rather generous allocations of emission 
allowances as well as a global trend towards emissions reductions. 
Summing up, the competitive record of the EU ETS is mixed, with emission trading coming 
out as the cheapest option, if we accept a reality with climate change and Kyoto compliance. 
However, the ETS is not designed to boost Europe’s economy, its prime purpose and 
justification is to ensure Europe’s CO2 emissions are brought down according to comittment 
levels of Kyoto in 2012 at minimal costs. Thus the most important conclusion is analogous to 
Parry (2002) who states with regard to the double dividend hypothesis that “environmental 
taxes need to be justified on environmental grounds” (p. 2). This holds true for a trading 
scheme like the EU ETS as well. Emissions trading should be justified on environmental 
grounds. It is especially important that modifications to the system due to economic 
considerations do not undermine the environmental impacts intended with this policy 
instrument. It is always welcome as a side effect, but introducing environmental regulation is 
not designed to generally improve competitiveness. Theory contradicting this claim exists – 
the Porter-hypothesis is predominant in this respect. This paper shows that they cannot be 
applied in unqualified form to an EU ETS. In any case, this paper shows that the fears of the 
majority of sectors concerned about strong negative competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS 
are not justified. 
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Annex: Synopsis of the literature on ETS and competitiveness 
Authors Model Critical Assumptions  Reference 
Scenario, 
projection period 
(if given) 
Scenarios Results 
IPTS (2000) POLES, a 
partial 
equilibrium 
model for the 
world energy 
system 
certificate prices of 49 € per 
ton of CO2 modelled; 
overestimates cost 
reductions, as transaction 
costs and market failure 
neglected 
no-trading-scenario 
(national 
compliance to 
Kyoto-goals) for 
2010 
EU-wide emissions trading scheme profits for all participants (highest profits 
for EU-south, Germany and Italy); average 
cost reductions of 25 per cents  
Capros and 
Mantzos (2000) 
PRIMES, a 
sectoral model 
for the energy 
market 
burden sharing; EU reduction 
target of eight per cents 
no-trading-scenario 
(national 
compliance or 
alternatively 
compliance within 
national sectors to 
Kyoto-goals) for 
2010 
(1): EU-wide ETS between energy 
suppliers, (2): EU-wide ETS 
between energy suppliers and 
energy-intensive branches, (3) EU-
wide ETS between all sectors, (4): 
international ETS including 
Annex-B countries (all sectors) 
ETS induces cost reductions (alternative 
reference scenario: 20.7-48.6 per cents); 
enlargements of ETS lead to additional cost 
reductions 
ERM and 
Eurelectric 
(2002) 
GETS 3, a 
partial model 
for the energy 
market 
covers pre-commitment-
period (2005-2007) and two 
commitment-periods (2008-
2012, 2013-2017); 
approximately 50 
sensitivities applied to basis 
scenarios  
see scenarios three basis scenarios: (1): no-
trading scenario, (2): latest guess-
scenario (according to EU ET 
directive from March 2003), (3): 
perfect trading-scenario (all 
possible participants trade fully 
under free market rules from 2005) 
constraints increase trading costs; least 
abatement costs under perfect trading; latest 
guess (no trading) leads to cost increase of 
1.6 (80.5) billion €; distributional effects if 
auctioning applies 
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Klepper and 
Peterson (2004) 
DART, a 
computable 
general 
equilibrium 
model 
no market failure; JI/CDM 
neglected 
business as usual-
scenario for 2012 
(1): least-cost (LC)-scenario, (2): 
unilateral policy-scenario (UNI) 
small competitiveness-effects: output loss 
of 0.3 per cents (LC); positive 
competitiveness-effects of LC in 
comparison with UNI 
Smale et al. 
(2006) 
Economic 
Cournot model 
of oligopoly 
behaviour 
Cournot-competition 
(oligopoly) modelled; 
sectoral analysis of EU ETS 
business as usual (1): certificate price of 15 € per ton 
of CO2; (2): 30 €  
aluminium sector relocates completely due 
to EU ETS; for the other sectors concerned, 
earnings rise as additional burden is 
overcompensated by grandfathered 
certificate value 
Reinaud (2005) Partial model sectoral analysis of EU ETS; 
competitiveness effects 
defined as output variation; 
certificate price of 10 € per 
ton of CO2 
business as usual: 
increasing CO2-
emissions 
according to World 
Energy Outlook 
(1): ten per cent scenario (90 per 
cents of certificates needed are 
grandfathered); (2): twenty per 
cent scenario (80 per cents 
grandfathered) 
generally modest competitiveness effects; 
aluminium sector looses from EU ETS: cost 
increase of 3.7 per cents in both scenarios 
(demand decrease of 2.9 per cents) 
Böhringer et 
al. (2005) 
SIMAC, a 
simple 
numerical 
partial 
equilibrium 
model of the EU 
carbon market 
JI/CDM neglected; model 
assumes Kyoto commitment: 
if the NAPs/ETS are not 
sufficient in this regard, 
abatement is shifted to 
sectors not participating 
(domestic action) 
see scenarios (1): no trade scenario: EU member 
states meet the emissions reduction 
target through cost-efficient 
domestic action; (2): unrestricted 
emissions trading across all sectors 
and EU member states; (3): 
emissions as suggested by NAPs 
lowest compliance costs under unrestricted 
trading (2.1 billion €); scenario (3) induces 
highest costs (17.6 vs. 3.4 billion € under 
scenario (1)); lower costs for (3) if JI/CDM 
considered; (3) induces burden shifting 
between sectors 
Kemfert et al. 
(2005) 
GTAP-E, a 
computable 
general 
equilibrium 
model 
 see scenarios experiment 1: Kyoto-compliance 
within national sectors; experiment 
2: national trade; experiment 3: 
additionally trade between EU-
member states 
cost reductions due to enlargements of ETS; 
higher efficiency gains under experiment 2 
than under experiment 3 
COWI (2004) GTAP-ECAT, a 
computable 
general 
equilibrium 
model 
JI/CDM included business as usual (1): EU ETS with long-term 
technology adaptation; (2): EU 
ETS with sluggish shorter-term 
adaptation 
output reduction of -0.36 per cent (-0.48 per 
cent with sluggish adaptation); allowance 
price of 17 €/tCO2 (26.5 €/tCO2); JI/CDM 
has positive effect on competitiveness 
 19
References 
Albrecht, J. (1998), Environmental Regulation, Comparative Advantage and the Porter 
Hypothesis, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Nota di Lavoro No. 59-98, Milano. 
Beise-Zee, M. and K. Rennings (2005), Lead Markets and Regulation: A Framework for 
Analyzing the International Diffusion of Environmental Innovation, Ecological Economics 
52, 5-17. 
Bickel, P. and R. Friedrich (Eds.) (2005), ExternE – Externalities of Energy. Methodology 
2005 Update. European Commission, Community Research, EUR 21951, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 
Böhringer, C., T. Hoffmann, A. Lange, A. Löschel, and U. Moslener (2005), Assessing 
Emissions Regulation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach, Energy Journal 26, 1-
22. 
Capros, P. and L. Mantzos (2000), The economic effects of EU-wide industry level 
emissions trading to reduce greenhouse gases. Results from PRIME Energy-Systems Model, 
Athen. 
Carbon Trust (2004), The European Emissions Trading Scheme, London. 
Cramton, P. and S. Kerr (2002), Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and why to 
auction not grandfather, Energy Policy 30, 333-345. 
Eikmeier, B., J. Gabriel, and W. Pfaffenberger (2005), Perspektiven für die 
energieintensive Industrie im europäischen Strommarkt unter Berücksichtigung der 
Regulierung der Netzentgelte. Endbericht, Bremer Energie Institut, Bremen. 
ERM (Environmental Resources Management) and Euroelectric (Union of the 
Electricity Industry) (2002), GETS 3 –Greenhouse Gas and Energy Trading Simulation, 
Final Report, Environmental Resources Management, Oxford. 
European Commission DG Environment, McKinsey and Ecofys (2005), Review of EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Survey Highlights, Brussels. 
Gagelmann, F. and M. Frondel (2005), The Impact of Emissions Trading on Innovation – 
Science Fiction or Reality? European Environment 15, 203-211. 
Hoel, M. (1991), Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by 
one country, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 55-70. 
Institute for Prospektive Technological Studies (IPTS) (2000), Preliminary Analysis of the 
Implementation of an EU-Wide Permit Trading Scheme on CO Emissions Abatement Costs. 
Results from the POLES model, Sevilla. 
Kemfert, C., M. Kohlhaas, T. Truong, and A. Protsenko (2005), The Environmental and 
Economic Effects of European Emissions Trading, DIW Discussions Papers 533, Berlin. 
Klepper, G. and S. Peterson (2004), The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Allowance Prices, 
Trade Flows, Competitiveness Effects, Kiel Working Paper No. 1195, Kiel Institute for World 
Economics, Kiel. 
Kruger, J. A. and W.A. Pizer (2004), Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe - The New Grand 
Policy Experiment, Environment 46, 8-23. 
Parry, I.W. (2002), Are Tradable Emissions Permits a Good Idea? Resources for the Future 
Issues Brief 02-33, Washington D.C. 
Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde (1995), Toward a New Conception of the Environment –
Competitiveness Relationship, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, 97-118. 
Reinaud, J. (2005), Industrial Competitiveness under the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme, IEA Information Paper, Paris. 
Rennings, K. and O. Hohmeyer (1999), Linking Weak and Strong Sustainability Indicators: 
The Case of Global Warming, in: Hohmeyer, O. and K. Rennings (Eds.): Man-Made Climate 
Change – Economic Aspects and Policy Options, Heidelberg, 83-110. 
 20
Rennings, K., R. Kemp, M. Bartolomeo, J. Hemmelskamp, and D. Hitchens (2004), 
Blueprints for an Integration of Science, Technology and Environmental Policy, ZEW 
Mannheim. 
SRU – Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (2006), Die nationale Umsetzung des 
europäischen Emissionshandels: Marktwirtschaftlicher Klimaschutz oder Fortsetzung der 
energiepolitischen Subventionspolitik mit anderen Mitteln? Stellungnahme, Berlin. 
Smale, R., Hartley, M., Hepburn, C., Ward, J., and M. Grubb (2006), The Impact of CO2 
Emissions Trading on Firm Profits and Market Prices, Climate Policy 6, 29-46. 
 
